




## 3-5 China's Reclamation Activities in SCS (for each feature)

### Gaven Reefs





### 3-6 China's Reclamation Activities in SCS (for each feature)

#### Fiery Cross Reef

August 2014



(Ref.) CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative / DigitalGlobe

March 2015



(Ref.) CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative / DigitalGlobe



## 3-7 China's Reclamation Activities in SCS (for each feature)

### Subi Reef

January 2015



(Ref.) IHS Jane's

April 2015



(Ref.) The Diplomat





## 3-8 China's Reclamation Activities in SCS (for each feature)


### Mischief Reef

January 2012



(Ref.) CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative / DigitalGlobe

April 2015





(Ref.) The Diplomat



# 4 China's Increasing Presence after Spratly's Militarization

In general terms, China's possible construction of military facilities in the Spratly Islands would have the following ramifications.



## Effects of Port Construction

- **Building port facilities** of certain size capable of berthing, resupply and maintenance would enable China to maintain more robust naval and maritime law enforcement presence in the entire SCS.
- ⇒ Some observers suggest considerable impact on coastal states of the SCS.

## Effects of Runway Construction

- **Fiery Cross Reef with an airstrip** and support facilities would enable China to forward-deploy various aerial platforms (incl. fighters, bombers and UAVs). Its ramifications may include:
  - ① China's improved **air power-projection capability** over the entire SCS;
  - ② **enhanced air superiority** over the SCS;
  - ③ **improved A2/AD capabilities** against U.S. intervention; and,
  - ④ possible declaration of an **"SCS Air Defense Identification Zone"**.
- **Reclamation is also being done at large-scale features** such as Subi Reef, leading some observers to suggest possible construction of multiple airstrips in the Spratly Islands and attendant increase in China's air force presence.



## Effects of Increasing Air/Maritime Presence

- **Sustained deployment of various platforms** including naval and law enforcement ships as well as aircraft enabled by military base construction would dramatically improve China's ISR and other mission capabilities in the central and southern portions of the SCS.
- Some observers express concern over China's achieving further *fait accompli* in the maritime domain, if China showcases the viability of these "islands" to sustain economic life by, for example, promoting civilian settlement (e.g. fishermen).

# 5 Comparison of Navy/Air Force Capabilities (China & Philippines/Vietnam/Malaysia)

There is a vast gap both in the quality and quantity of navy/air force capabilities between main coastal states in SCS (i.e. the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia) and China.

## China Warship × 892 (1,423kt)



Submarine: Shang-class (6,100t) × 2  
 Yuan-class (2,900t) × 12  
 Kilo-class (3,100t) × 12 etc.  
 Destroyer: Sovremenny-class (6,500t) × 4  
 Luyang II (5,700t) × 3 etc.

## Combat aircraft × 2,582

(incl. 4<sup>th</sup>-generation fighter × 689)

Fighter: J-10 × 264  
 Su-27/J-11 × 328  
 Su-30 × 97 etc.  
 Patrol aircraft (fixed-wing): Y-8 × 3 etc.

## MLEF vessel × 370+

Coastal patrol vessel (>1,500t) × 18  
 Coastal patrol vessel (<1,500t) × 48 etc.

※ According to Global Times, China possesses 52 MLEF vessels (>1,000t-class).

## Vietnam

### Warship × 94 (37kt)

Submarine: Kilo-class(3,100t) × 2; Yugo-class(100t) × 2  
 Frigate: Gepard-class (1,600t) × 2; Petya-class (1,000t) × 5  
 Corvette: BPS500 (400t) × 1

### Combat aircraft × 97 (incl. 4<sup>th</sup>-generation fighter × 34)


Fighter: Su-30MK2 × 23; Su-27 × 11; MiG-21 × 33 etc.  
 Patrol aircraft (fixed-wing): null

### Naval Infantry: approx. 27,000

### Vietnam Coast Guard: vessel × 34+

### (Vietnam Fisheries Resources Surveillance)

Coastal patrol vessel (>1,500t) × 2  
 Coastal patrol vessel (<1,500t) × 1; Patrol aircraft × 3 etc.



## Philippines

### Warship × 80 (47kt)

Submarine: null  
 Frigate: Hamilton-class (2,700t) × 2  
 Cannon-class (1,400t) × 1  
 Corvette: Auk-class (1,100t) × 2 etc.

### Combat aircraft × 26

Fighter: null※  
 Attacker: OV-10 Bronco × 10  
 Patrol aircraft (fixed-wing): F-27 × 1; N-22SL × 1 etc.


### Marines: approx. 8,300

### Philippine Coast Guard: vessel × 58

Coastal patrol vessel (<1,500t) × 5  
 Air-sea rescue helicopter × 3 etc.



※ The Philippines purchased 12 Korean fighters FA-50 in 2014, and they will be in service by 2017.



## Malaysia

### Warship × 208 (58kt)

Submarine: Scorpène-class (1,800t) × 2  
 Frigate: Lekiu-class (1,900t) × 2; Corvette: Kasturi-class (1,500t) × 2 etc.


### Combat aircraft × 71 (incl. 4<sup>th</sup>-generation fighter × 36)

Fighter: Mig-29 × 10; Su-30MKM × 18; F/A-18 × 8 etc.  
 Patrol aircraft (fixed-wing): null

### Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agency: 4,500

### Vessel × 189; Marine Police: 2,100

Coastal patrol vessel (>1,500t) × 2; Patrol aircraft × 2  
 Air-sea rescue helicopter × 3 etc.





## 6 Development Trends of Other Countries/Region in SCS

- Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Taiwan in the 1980s/90s built runways (600-1,200m) on the land features over which they have *de facto* control.
- All these countries/region have done facility maintenance and development. Reports suggest that Vietnam has recently conducted reclamation work.

